

Economía Política
Seminario General - Primavera 2019

Martes 8:30am - 12:00pm
Salón 2, Cuajimalpa

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Horas de oficina: martes, 10:00am-10:30pm y 12:00-12:30pm y por cita
Por favor registrarse con anticipación en el siguiente vínculo:
<https://calendly.com/sancheztalanquer>

Lecturas del curso:
https://cideo365-my.sharepoint.com/:f/g/personal/m_sancheztalanquer_cide_edu/Eu1cAD8blmdClxVPpLPHc1AB97Wegwzh8uSPWvULAzpuYw

Descripción del seminario

Este seminario estudia la intersección de la política, la desigualdad y el desarrollo en economías de mercado. Cada sesión busca familiarizar al estudiante con investigación académica reciente sobre temas cruciales en el estudio de la economía política contemporánea. Revisaremos los condicionantes políticos del orden, el bienestar material, la (des)igualdad y la distribución y el acceso efectivo a los derechos de ciudadanía. La aproximación a los temas es explícitamente comparada, histórica y metodológicamente diversa, con el fin de enriquecer la comprensión sobre distintas trayectorias de desarrollo y múltiples estrategias para producir conocimiento social sobre temas sustantivos. El hilo conductor consiste en la forma en que el poder, las instituciones políticas y los procesos de cambio social afectan variables económicas como el crecimiento y la desigualdad, y viceversa.

El seminario inicia con una exploración de los orígenes del orden y el Estado moderno, en tanto institución política que sostiene la interacción económica y social en sociedades de masas y territorios extensos. También se examinan las formas y condiciones en que la actuación del Estado puede inhibir o producir desarrollo económico y la fiscalidad estatal, como una ventana única hacia las relaciones sociales, la distribución del poder político y los alcances del ejercicio gubernamental.

La siguiente gran área de estudio es la relación bidireccional entre los regímenes políticos y las estructuras económicas. Las lecturas examinan los conflictos redistributivos que subyacen a la expansión de derechos políticos e instituciones democráticas, la estabilidad de los regímenes y la economía política del autoritarismo. Con este trasfondo, se analizan los factores detrás de las dificultades de la democracia para generar igualdad efectiva de oportunidades, moderar la acumulación de riqueza y producir mejoras significativas en el acceso a derechos económicos y sociales. Recibe especial atención la política social en las sociedades altamente desiguales y con

Estados limitados, como América Latina. Este módulo finaliza reflexionando sobre las tensiones contemporáneas entre la democracia liberal y la economía de mercado y las respuestas políticas a la inseguridad económica.

El seminario cierra con un conjunto de sesiones dedicadas al estudio de temas relevantes en la economía política del desarrollo: la corrupción, la permanencia de legados históricos y el papel de normas y factores culturales en el desarrollo económico y político. Las lecturas utilizadas echan mano de datos históricos y metodologías avanzadas para resolver preguntas clásicas como los efectos de las creencias religiosas y, en general, la interacción entre factores económicos y normas culturales.

Objetivos principales

- Familiarizar al estudiante con preguntas, debates, conceptos y hallazgos empíricos fundamentales sobre el desarrollo económico y político y la interacción entre ambas esferas.
- Fortalecer las habilidades de análisis comparado e histórico de variaciones temporales y espaciales en el desarrollo político, el bienestar material y la desigualdad.
- Cultivar la capacidad de interrogar fenómenos que solían darse por sentados y formular preguntas de investigación a partir de la observación del mundo con los lentes de la economía política.
- Familiarizar al estudiante con distintas aproximaciones teóricas y metodologías de análisis empírico para la generación de conocimiento sobre formas modernas de organización política y económica.

Requisitos y formato del seminario

1. Lectura y participación. Todos los estudiantes deberán asistir al seminario habiendo leído los textos señalados y reflexionado sobre ellos. El formato será propiamente el de seminario de discusión, por lo que la participación activa e informada son requisitos indispensables. Yo haré intervenciones para ofrecer un panorama general, ubicar los temas o textos en la investigación y los debates académicos, resolver dudas, subrayar puntos fundamentales y orientar la deliberación colectiva. No obstante, la dinámica del curso depende fuertemente de la discusión horizontal y busca contribuir a que los estudiantes aprendan a ser agentes de su propio aprendizaje.

El primer día de clase discutiremos estrategias efectivas de lectura. Como mínimo, para cada lectura es necesario identificar y reflexionar sobre los siguientes puntos:

- a. La pregunta de investigación principal, su importancia teórica y práctica, relación con otros textos y la forma en que ha sido planteada (¿qué se busca explicar (“variable dependiente”)? ¿cuál es la variación que motiva la investigación?);
- b. La tesis o argumento central, la(s) variable(s) explicativa(s) (“independiente”) que se propone, los mecanismos que conducen al fenómeno explicado, la relación entre el argumento propuesto y explicaciones alternativas y las condiciones de aplicabilidad del argumento.

- c. Los datos o material empírico utilizados por el autor para probar, informar o aterrizar el argumento teórico (casos, período histórico, etcétera).
 - d. El diseño y estrategia empírica, la metodología utilizada para analizar el material empírico, verificar el argumento y/o sus implicaciones observables y descartar explicaciones alternativas.
 - e. Resultados, principales hallazgos y conclusiones que se derivan del texto.
2. Presentaciones en clase y grupos de trabajo. Cada sesión, dos estudiantes deberán realizar, de manera coordinada, una presentación inicial conjunta sobre las lecturas asignadas. Cada estudiante realizará esta presentación (junto con otra persona) dos veces durante el semestre. Estas presentaciones tendrán una duración aproximada de 20 minutos y servirán para iniciar la discusión en clase. Las presentaciones no deben ser simplemente un resumen de las lecturas asignadas, sino a partir de los argumentos y hallazgos principales, señalar controversias o temas polémicos fundamentales, reflexionar sobre puntos débiles y formas de mejorar un texto en particular, señalar oportunidades de investigación que se abren a partir de lo planteado por las lecturas, evaluar la calidad y originalidad de las aportaciones, etcétera. Es posible que existan diferencias de interpretación de los textos entre los presentadores, en cuyo caso sus puntos de vista deberán formar parte de la presentación. En cualquier caso, las presentaciones deben señalar de manera global “qué aprendimos y qué no” de las lecturas de la semana y desarrollar un argumento claro, coherente y sujeto a debate sobre el tema global de la sesión, a partir de una síntesis de lo expuesto en las lecturas.

Después de dicha presentación, dos estudiantes contarán con 5 minutos cada uno para reaccionar a la exposición de sus compañeros, con base en su propia interpretación y reacciones a las lecturas. Cada estudiante desempeñará este papel en dos ocasiones durante el semestre. En esta exposición, se plantearán posibles interpretaciones o argumentos alternativos, se valorará el argumento ofrecido en la presentación por los expositores y se señalarán posibles puntos de divergencia o aclaración a resolver durante el resto de la sesión. El objetivo de estas intervenciones no es criticar la exposición de sus compañeros, sino contribuir a sentar las bases de la discusión durante el resto de la sesión a partir de valoraciones alternativas, un análisis distinto de las lecturas, etcétera.

3. Dictámenes. Cada estudiante deberá localizar dos artículos académicos no publicados (“working paper”) de su interés, relacionados con dos de los temas del seminario o afines, y elaborar un dictamen de valoración, de aproximadamente 2,000 palabras. Durante el curso distribuiré material sobre cómo realizar un dictamen académico y ofreceré ejemplos de dictámenes que yo mismo he recibido (sobre un artículo que leeremos, de modo que tendrán acceso tanto a la versión del artículo sometida a dictamen y las respuestas). Además de ofrecer valoraciones críticas, su texto deberá identificar “puntos fuertes” del artículo seleccionado y realizar sugerencias concretas de mejora al autor.

El primer dictamen deberá entregarse a más tardar en la sesión del 9 de abril. La fecha límite para entrega del segundo dictamen es el 28 de mayo.

4. Trabajo final. El último requisito del curso es un trabajo final o propuesta de investigación, de 18-22 páginas a doble espacio, con fecha límite de entrega el martes 11 de junio. Los trabajos finales deberán: contener una pregunta original de investigación claramente planteada y motivada; ubicar brevemente su relación con la literatura relevante; identificar variables independientes y dependientes, así como hipótesis o proposiciones causales sobre su relación; explicar el diseño de investigación y material empírico a utilizar para informar o probar dichas proposiciones; evidencia preliminar o de ser posible, análisis empírico con resultados.

Evaluación

Ejercicios de dictamen: 30%

Presentaciones y participación en clase: 30%

Trabajo final: 40%

1. Fundamentos: Sociedad, Mercado, Política (5 de febrero)

- Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Knopf. 3-17.
- Lindblom, Charles E. 1982. "The Market as Prison." *The Journal of Politics* 44(2): 324–36.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 2013. "The Concept of Interest: From Euphemism to Tautology" y "Rival Views of Market Society." In *The Essential Hirschman*, ed. Jeremy Adelman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 195-247.
- Karl Polanyi. 1944. *The Great Transformation*. New York: Rinehart & Company. p. 43-55, 130-135.
- Herring, Ronald. 2016. "Class Politics in India: Euphemization, Identity, and Power." In *Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics*, eds. Atul Kohli and Prerna Singh. New York: Routledge.

Recomendadas:

Swedberg, Richard. 2003. *Principles of Economic Sociology*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Capítulos 6 y 7. 131-188.

Przeworski, Adam, and Michael Wallerstein. 1988. "Structural Dependence of the State on Capital." *American Political Science Review* 82(1): 11–29.

Marx, Karl. 1978. "The German Ideology: Part 1." In *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

2. Características y capacidades del Estado moderno (jueves, febrero 14)

- Dincecco, Mark. 2015. "The Rise of Effective States in Europe." *The Journal of Economic History* 75(03): 901–918.

- Centeno, Miguel. 1997. "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America." *American Journal of Sociology* 102(6): 1565–1605.
- Soifer, Hillel. 2008. "State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43(3–4): 231–51.
- Scott, James C., John Tehranian, and Jeremy Mathias. 2002. "The Production of Legal Identities Proper to States: The Case of the Permanent Family Surname." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44(1): 4–44.

Recomendadas:

- Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics." *American Economic Review* 99(4): 1218–44.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Finan, Frederico, Benjamin A Olken, and Rohini Pande. 2015. *The Personnel Economics of the State*. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper.
- Levi, Margaret. 1988. *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lee, Melissa, and Nan Zhang. 2017. "Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity." *The Journal of Politics* 79(1): 118–32.

3. Bases institucionales del desarrollo (febrero 19)

- Greif, Avner. 2015. "Coercion and Exchange: How Did Markets Evolve?" In *Institutions, Innovation, and Industrialization: Essays in Economic History and Development*, eds. Avner Greif, Laura Lynne Kiesling, and John V.C. Nye.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(4): 1231–94.
- Cox, Gary W., and Barry R. Weingast. 2018. "Executive Constraint, Political Stability, and Economic Growth." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(3): 279–303.
- Coatsworth, John H. 2005. "Structures, Endowments, and Institutions in the Economic History of Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 40(3): 126–44.

Recomendadas:

- North, Douglass C. 1981. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: Norton.
- North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- North, Douglass, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry Weingast. 2009. *Violence and Social Orders*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- North, Douglass, and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 803–32.
- Weingast, Barry R. 2005. "The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(3): 89–108.
- Hoffman, Philip T. 2012. "Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World?" *The Journal of Economic History* 72(3): 601–33.
- Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development." *Journal of Economic Growth* 9(2): 131–65.
- Boix, Carles, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2014. "Bones of Contention: The Political Economy of Height Inequality." *American Political Science Review* 108(1): 1–22.
- Fails, Matthew D., and Jonathan Kriekhaus. 2010. "Colonialism, Property Rights and the Modern World Income Distribution." *British Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 487–508.
- Coatsworth, John H. 2012. "Desigualdad, instituciones y crecimiento económico en América Latina." *Economía / Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú* 35(69).
- Sokoloff, Kenneth L., and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3): 217–32.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2005. "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth." *American Economic Review* 95(3): 546–79.
- Haber, Stephen H, Maurer, Noel, and Armando Razo. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

4. Financiamiento del Estado moderno y capacidad fiscal (febrero 26)

- Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1991. "The Crisis of the Tax State." In *The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism*, ed. Richard Swedberg. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 2009. "Foreword." In *The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective*, eds. Isaac William Martin, Ajay K. Mehrotra, and Monica Prasad. New York: Cambridge University Press, xi–xiii.
- Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. 2010. "The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation." *International Organization* 64(4): 529–61.
- Sánchez-Talanquer, Mariano. 2018. "One-Eyed State: The Politics of Legibility and Property Taxation." Unpublished manuscript.
- Fairfield, Tasha. 2015. *Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America: Business Power and Tax Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. C. 1-2.

Recomendadas:

- Lieberman, Evan. 2002. "Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations: Possibilities and Pitfalls in Cross-National Research." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36(4): 89–115.

- Martin, Isaac William, Ajay K. Mehrotra, and Monica Prasad, eds. 2009. *The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Beramendi, Pablo, Mark Dincecco, and Melissa Rogers. 2018. "Intra-Elite Competition and Long-Run Fiscal Development." *The Journal of Politics* 81(1): 49–65.
- Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2014. "Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28(4): 99–120.
- Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. 2012. "Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation." *American Political Science Review* 106(1): 81–102.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

5. El Estado desarrollista (marzo 5)

- Coase, Ronald. 1974. "The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas." *The American Economic Review* 64(2): 384–91.
- Chang, Ha-Joon. 1999. "The Economic Theory of the Developmental State." In *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Chaudry, Kiren Aziz. 1993. "The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers." *Politics & Society* 21(3): 245–74.
- Doner, Richard F., Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater. 2005. "Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective." *International Organization* 59(2): 327–61.
- Block, Fred. 2008. "Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United States." *Politics & Society* 36(2): 169–206.
- Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, and Atif Mian. 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120(4): 1371–1411.

Recomendadas:

- Evans, Peter B. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 3-20, 43-73.
- Dincecco, Mark, and Gabriel Katz. 2016. "State Capacity and Long-Run Economic Performance." *The Economic Journal* 126(590): 189–218.
- Evans, Peter. 1997. "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization." *World Politics* 50(1): 62–87.
- Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed. 1999. *The Developmental State*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

6. Economía política del cambio de régimen (marzo 12)

- Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1-47, 173-180. Ojea cap. 3, 48-87.

- Ansell, Ben, and David Samuels. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach*. New York: Cambridge University Press. C. 1-2
- Ziblatt, Daniel. 2008. "Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization?: A Test of the 'Bread and Democracy' Thesis and the Case of Prussia." *World Politics* 60(4): 610–41.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 2012. "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule." *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 495–516.

Recomendadas:

- Slater, Dan, Benjamin Smith, and Gautam Nair. 2014. "Economic Origins of Democratic Breakdown? The Redistributive Model and the Postcolonial State." *Perspectives on Politics* 12(2): 353–374.
- Haber, Stephen, and Victor Menaldo. 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse." *The American Political Science Review* 105(1): 1–26.
- Bellin, Eva. 2000. "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries." *World Politics* 52(2): 175–205.
- Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens. 1997. "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions." *Comparative Politics* 29(3): 323–42.
- Usmani, Adaner. 2018. "Democracy and the Class Struggle." *American Journal of Sociology* 124(3): 664–704.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115(4): 1167–99.
- Teele, Dawn. forthcoming. "How the West Was Won: Competition, Mobilization, and Women's Enfranchisement in the United States." *Journal of Politics*.
- Llavador, Humberto, and Robert J. Oxoby. 2005. "Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120(3): 1155–89.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2009. "Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions." *British Journal of Political Science* 39(2): 291–321.
- Ziblatt, Daniel. 2006. "How Did Europe Democratize?" *World Politics* 58(2): 311–38.
- Ziblatt, Daniel. 2017. *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

7. Democracia, desigualdad y redistribución (marzo 19)

- Leer solo páginas p. 914-917 y 924-25: Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89(5): 914–27.
- Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others." *The American Political Science Review* 100(2): 165–81.

- Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. 2018. *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1-62.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. 2002. "Social Inequalities Without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36(4): 3–33.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. "Contentious Democratization." En *Dynamics of Contention*. New York: Cambridge University Press. P.264-303.

Recomendadas:

- Atkinson, Anthony B, and François Bourguignon, eds. 2000. *Handbook of Income Distribution*. New York: Elsevier. Vols. 1 y 2. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/handbook/handbook-of-income-distribution/volumes>
- Thachil, Tariq. 2014. "Elite Parties and Poor Voters: Theory and Evidence from India." *American Political Science Review* 108(2): 454–77.
- Scheidel, Walter. 2017. *The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2004. "Constitutions and Economic Policy." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18(1): 75–98.
- Albertus, Michael. 2017. "Landowners and Democracy: The Social Origins of Democracy Reconsidered." *World Politics* 69(2): 233–76.
- Ardanaz, Martin, and Isabela Mares. 2014. "Labor Shortages, Rural Inequality, and Democratization." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(12): 1639–69.
- Lupu, Noam, and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. "The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 105(2): 316–36.
- Boix, Carles. 2001. "Democracy, Development, and the Public Sector." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 1–17.
- Ross, Michael. 2006. "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 860–74.
- Rodrik, Dani. 1999. "Democracies Pay Higher Wages." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114(3): 707–38.
- Philipp Rehm, "Social Policy by Popular Demand," *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (April 2011): 271–99.
- Soifer, Hillel. 2013. "State Power and the Economic Origins of Democracy." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 48(1): 1–22.
- Shapiro, Ian. 2002. "Why the Poor Don't Soak the Rich." *Daedalus* 131(1): 118–28.
- Lindert, Peter. 2004. *Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R Kaufman. 2008. *Development, Democracy, and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

8. Redistribución en autocracia (marzo 26)

- Michael Albertus, *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 1-59.

- Michael Albertus et al., “Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico,” *World Development* 77 (January 2016): 154–70.
- Horacio Larreguy, Juan Felipe Riaño, and Mariano Sánchez-Talanquer, “Social Dissent, Coercive Capacity, and Redistributive Strategies: Evidence from Authoritarian Mexico” (2018).
- Morrison, Kevin M. 2009. “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability.” *International Organization* 63(1): 107–38.

9. Desigualdad, representación e influencia política (abril 2)

- Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2010. “Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States.” *Politics & Society* 38(2): 152–204.
- Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” *Perspectives on Politics* 12(3): 564–81.
- Achen, Christopher H, and Larry M Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. P. 1-12, 21-51, and 316-318.
- Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2012. “Presidents and the Political Economy: The Coalitional Foundations of Presidential Power.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 42(1): 101–31.
- Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. 2015. “Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America.” *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1): 1–18.

10. Reformas de mercado en América Latina (abril 9)

- Williamson, John. 2000. “What Washington Means by Policy Reform.” In *Modern Political Economy and Latin America: Theory and Policy*, eds. Jeffrey A Frieden, Manuel Pastor, and Michael Tomz. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 18–23.
- Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2006. “Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism.” *International Organization* 60(4): 781–810.
- Weyland, Kurt. 1998. “Swallowing the Bitter Pill: Sources of Popular Support for Neoliberal Reform in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies* 31(5): 539–68.
- Gibson, Edward L. 1997. “The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina.” *World Politics* 49(3): 339–70.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. 1995. “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case.” *World Politics* 48(1): 82–116.

Recomendadas:

Campello, Daniela. 2014. “The Politics of Financial Booms and Crises: Evidence From Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies* 47(2): 260–86.

- Baker, Andy. 2009. *The Market and the Masses in Latin America: Policy Reform and Consumption in Liberalizing Economies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Silva, Eduardo. 2009. *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stokes, Susan Carol. 2001. *Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612978> (January 31, 2019).
- Hellman, Joel S. 1998. "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions." *World Politics* 50(2): 203–34.
- Baker, Andy, and Kenneth F. Greene. 2011. "The Latin American Left's Mandate: Free-Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies." *World Politics* 63(1): 43–77.

11. Política social y sectores populares en el "Sur Global" (abril 23)

- Nooruddin, Irfan, and Nita Rudra. 2014. "Are Developing Countries Really Defying the Embedded Liberalism Compact?" *World Politics* 66(4): 603–40.
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